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ABSTRACT
Facebook is the world’s largest Online Social Network, hav-
ing more than 1 billion users. Like most other social net-
works, Facebook is home to various categories of hostile
entities who abuse the platform by posting malicious con-
tent. In this paper, we identify and characterize Facebook
pages that engage in spreading URLs pointing to malicious
domains. We used the Web of Trust API to determine do-
main reputations of URLs published by pages, and identified
627 pages publishing untrustworthy information, misleading
content, adult and child unsafe content, scams, etc. which
are deemed as“Page Spam”by Facebook, and do not comply
with Facebook’s community standards.
Our findings revealed dominant presence of politically po-
larized entities engaging in spreading content from untrust-
worthy web domains. Anger and religion were the most promi-
nent topics in the textual content published by these pages.
We found that at least 8% of all malicious pages were ded-
icated to promote a single malicious domain. Studying the
temporal posting activity of pages revealed that malicious
pages were more active than benign pages. We further identi-
fied collusive behavior within a set of malicious pages spread-
ing adult and pornographic content. We believe our findings
will enable technologists to devise efficient automated solu-
tions to identify and curb the spread of malicious content
through such pages. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first attempt in literature, focused exclusively on char-
acterizing malicious Facebook pages.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are an integral part of the
World Wide Web today. Internet users around the world use
OSNs as primary sources to consume news, updates, and in-
formation about events around the world. Twitter is the
most preferred platform for breaking news, while Facebook
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leads the way in terms of the number of users who con-
sume news from the social network [20]. However, given the
enormous volume, it is hard to moderate all content that
is generated and shared on OSNs. This enables hostile enti-
ties to generate and promote all sorts of malicious content
and pollute the information stream for monetary gains, or
to simply compromise system reputation. Such activity not
only degrades user experience, but also violates the terms of
service of most OSN platforms.
Multiple researchers in the past have proposed automated
techniques to identify hostile user accounts on OSNs that
engage in spreading malware, unsolicited spam, and phish-
ing [4, 17, 25, 26], or collude to artificially inflate the so-
cial capital of other entities [24, 29]. However, in a recent
study, we discovered the presence of malicious Facebook
pages, which have not been studied in detail in the past [7].
Certain security experts and news sources have also acknowl-
edged the presence of malicious pages on Facebook, set up
intentionally to spread phishing, scams, and other types of
malicious content. For example, a group of scammers set
Figure 1: Fake British Air Facebook page offering
free flights for a year in return for liking, comment-
ing on, and sharing their post.
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up a fake British Airways page, offering free flights to cus-
tomers for a year (Figure 1). The page asked users to share
a photo, like the page and leave a comment to claim their
free flights. 1 In another similar incident, an international
football player’s name was used as bait to set up a Face-
book page, and users were asked to sign a fake petition. 2
Scammers can use such events to gather large audience for
their pages, and then bombard users with other unwanted,
spammy promotions, and potentially dodgy links that could
lead to a malware infection or users being phished. It has
been claimed that Facebook pages spam is a $200 million
business. 3
Facebook pages are an important and integral part of the
Facebook ecosystem, that offer a free platform for promotion
of businesses, brands and organizations. 4 From an attacker’s
perspective, Facebook pages are potentially lucrative tools
to gather large audiences and target all of them at once.
However, past research on malicious entities on Facebook
is largely restricted to identifying user profiles [2, 25]. In
this paper, we focus strictly on malicious Facebook pages.
We identify and characterize a set of 627 pages that pub-
lished one or more malicious URLs in their most recent 100
posts. We go beyond traditional classes of malicious con-
tent like phishing and spam, and also study pages which
spread untrustworthy information, hate speech, nudity, mis-
leading claims. Such content is also deemed as malicious by
community standards [9] and“Page Spam”definitions estab-
lished by Facebook. We identify malicious pages by looking
up the Web of Trust (WOT) domain reputations of URLs
published by pages, and filter out pages posting URLs from
low-reputation domains (in terms of trustworthiness, child
safety, etc.). Then, we explore who are the entities behind
these pages, and characterize and compare the behavior of
malicious pages with benign pages. Our broad findings are
as follows:
• Politically polarized malicious entities: We iden-
tified numerous politically polarized entities which dom-
inated our dataset of malicious pages, and published
URLs from untrustworthy web domains.
• Dedicated pages for malicious domains: We found
that at least 8% of pages in our dataset were dedicated
to promoting content from only one malicious web do-
main. This behavior indicated that some malicious en-
tities intentionally set up Facebook pages dedicated to
spreading their own content.
• Malicious pages were more active: We found that
malicious pages were more active (in terms of posting)
than benign pages; the number of malicious pages that
were active daily was over three times the number of
benign pages that were active daily.
• Malicious pages showed collusive behavior: We
found presence of collusive behavior within malicious
1https://grahamcluley.com/2015/09/british-airways-isnt-
giving-away-free-flights-year-facebook-scam/
2http://www.marca.com/2014/07/18/en/football/barcelona/
1405709402.html
3http://mashable.com/2013/08/29/facebook-fan-pages-spam-
200-million-business/
4https://www.facebook.com/help/174987089221178
pages in our dataset; malicious pages engaged in pro-
moting (liking, commenting on, and sharing) each oth-
ers’ content.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
in literature, focused exclusively on characterizing malicious
Facebook pages. The rest of the paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 gives the background and scope of our re-
search, and explains the data collection process. Character-
ization and analysis of malicious pages make up Section 3.
Section 4 contains the discussion and implications of our
results. Related work is discussed in Section 5. We finally
conclude our work in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND
Some OSNs like Twitter and Instagram do not have re-
strictions on the number of connections an entity (user) can
have. However, other networks like Facebook pose a restric-
tion on the number of connections a user can have, and pro-
vide pages to enable large following for celebrities, groups,
businesses, etc. A Facebook page can have multiple admin-
istrators managing the page under the same name, without
the audience knowing. This allows pages to have a higher
degree of interaction with its audience and keeping it more
active as compared to a single user profile. Also, the most
popular page on Facebook has an audience of 514,654,759
fans (likes), which is approximately 100,000 times larger
than the maximum audience (friends) a Facebook user pro-
file can have (5,000 friends). 5 6 Our past research has shown
greater participation of Facebook pages in posting malicious
URLs as compared to posting benign URLs [7]. Such inflated
malicious activity and wide reach of Facebook pages make
them a vital aspect to study independently in detail.
2.1 Scope
The definition and scope of what should be labeled as“ma-
licious content” on the Internet has been constantly evolving
since the birth of the Internet. Researchers have been study-
ing malicious content in the form of spam and phishing for
over two decades. With respect to Online Social Networks,
state-of-the-art techniques have become efficient in automat-
ically detecting spam campaigns [11, 34], and phishing [1]
without human involvement. However, new classes of ma-
licious content pertaining to appropriateness, authenticity,
trustworthiness, and credibility of content have emerged in
the recent past. Some researchers have studied these classes
of malicious content on OSNs and shown their implications
in the real world [5, 13, 16, 19]. All of these studies, how-
ever, resorted to human expertise to identify untrustworthy
and inappropriate content and establish ground truth, due
to the absence of efficient automated techniques to identify
such content. We aim to study a similar class of malicious
content pertaining to trustworthiness and appropriateness
in this work, which currently requires human expertise to
identify. In particular, we look at Facebook pages that gen-
erate content deemed as malicious by Facebook’s community
standards and definitions of “Page Spam”. Facebook defines
“Page Spam” as pages that confuse, mislead, surprise or de-
5As on September 22, 2015. http://fanpagelist.com/category/
top users/
6Although user profiles on Facebook have a follow option,
followers of a user can only view posts which are public.
fraud people. 7 Additionally, pages that are misleading, de-
ceptive, or otherwise misrepresent the prize or any other as-
pect of promotion are considered as “Page Spam”. Facebook
has also established community standards to protect users
against nudity, hate speech, violence and graphic content,
fraud, sexual violence etc. [9].
Most URL blacklists (Google Safebrowsing, PhishTank,
SURBL, SpamHaus, etc.) used in past research are useful
to identify more obvious threats like phishing, spam, mal-
ware, etc. These blacklists are reasonably efficient, but are
not capable of identifying websites engaging in spreading
misleading information, hate speech, unethical claims, nu-
dity, etc. which are considered as Facebook’s community
standards and “Page Spam” definitions. In order to obtain
ground truth for such kind of malicious content, we used
the Web of Trust (WOT) API. WOT is a website repu-
tation and review service that helps people make informed
decisions about whether to trust a website or not [31]. WOT
is based on a unique crowdsourcing approach that collects
ratings and reviews from a global community of millions
of users who rate and comment on websites based on their
personal experiences. The community-powered approach en-
ables WOT to protect users against threats that only the
human eye can spot such as scams, unreliable web stores,
misleading websites, nudity, and questionable content, which
largely overlaps with Facebook definitions of spam.
We understand that WOT ratings are obtained through
crowd sourcing, and may seem to suffer from biases. How-
ever, WOT states that in order to keep ratings more reliable,
the system tracks each user’s rating behavior before decid-
ing how much it trusts the user. In addition, the meritocratic
nature of WOT makes it far more difficult for spammers to
abuse. We now discuss our data collection methodology in
detail.
2.2 Dataset
We collected a dataset of 4.4 million public posts from
Facebook between April 2013 and July 2014, and identi-
fied 11,217 posts containing malicious URLs by looking up
six URL blacklists [7]. Table 1 shows the descriptive statis-
tics of this dataset. We used the same dataset of Facebook
posts to obtain a true positive dataset of pages posting mali-
cious URLs. We rescanned the 1,696 pages posting malicious
URLs (as identified in our previous work [7]) to collect their
page information through the Facebook Graph API in Au-
gust 2015, and found that 418 out of the 1,696 pages did
not exist. For the remaining pages, we collected all posts
published by the pages using the /page-id/posts endpoint
of the Graph API. 8 We also collected all likes, comments,
and shares on the most recent 100 posts published by these
pages. We then looked up the WOT API for all URL do-
mains present in the most recent 100 posts, and found that
627 pages published one or more malicious URLs. We con-
sidered these pages as malicious. Interestingly, we found 31
malicious pages in our dataset that were verified by Face-
book. 9
Due to time constraints, we had to restrict the WOT API
lookups and collection of likes, comments, and shares to the
most recent 100 posts only. Researchers have adopted similar
7https://www.facebook.com/help/116053525145846
8https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/
page/feed
9https://www.facebook.com/help/196050490547892
methodology in the past, where they identified malicious
URLs in the 40 most recent Tweets of users to obtain a
ground truth dataset of spammers on Twitter [32].
Total posts 4,465,371
Total unique users 2,983,707
Total unique pages 390,246
Unique posts with URLs 1,222,137
Total unique URLs 480,407
Unique posts with malicious URLs 11,217
Unique users posting malicious URLs 6,286
Unique pages posting malicious URLs 1,696
Unique malicious URLs 4,622
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of complete dataset of
Facebook posts collected by Dewan et al. over April
2013 - July 2014.
The WOT API returns a reputation score for a given do-
main. Reputations are measured for domains in several com-
ponents, for example, trustworthiness. For each {domain,
component} pair, the system computes two values: a rep-
utation estimate and the confidence in the reputation. To-
gether, these indicate the amount of trust in the domain in
the given component. A reputation estimate of below 60 in-
dicates unsatisfactory. The WOT browser add-on requires a
confidence value of ≥ 10 before it presents a warning about
a website. We tested the domain of each URL in our dataset
for Trustworthiness and Child Safety components. For our
analysis, a URL was marked as malicious if both the afore-
mentioned conditions were satisfied (Algorithm 1). In addi-
tion to reputations, the WOT rating system also computes
categories for websites based on votes from users and third
parties. We marked a URL as malicious if it fell under the
Negative (including malware, scams etc.) or Questionable
(including hate, incidental nudity etc.) category group. 10
Algorithm 1 Detecting pages posting malicious URLs us-
ing WOT reputation scores.
for all pages do
for all 100 posts do
for all URL domains do
components = GetComponentsFromWOT API
for all components do
if reputation < 60 and confidence ≥ 10 then
page = malicious
continue
end if
end for
end for
end for
end for
We also drew an equal random sample of 1,696 pages from
the remaining benign pages in the dataset. Similar to our ap-
proach for identifying malicious pages, we collected all posts
published by the random sample of benign pages. We res-
canned the most recent 100 posts (including their likes, com-
ments, and shares) published by these pages and obtained
1,278 benign pages posting no malicious URLs in their most
10Exact category labels and description corresponding to
Negative and Questionable categories can be found at https:
//www.mywot.com/wiki/API
recent 100 posts. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of
all Facebook pages in our dataset.
Category Malicious Benign
No. of pages 627 (31) 1,278 (49)
All posts 9,341,420 3,890,101
Recent 100 posts 60,306 120,184
Recent 100 posts with URLs 55,233 92,980
Likes (recent 100 posts)11 3,447,669 31,680,263
Comments (recent 100 posts) 354,502 1,245,959
Shares (recent 100 posts) 507,964 1,012,151
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of our dataset of Face-
book pages. Numbers in the parentheses indicate
verified pages.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of posts
published, and number of page likes gathered by malicious
and benign pages in our dataset. We observed that ma-
licious pages published significantly more posts than be-
nign pages (µmalicious = 15,091.14 posts per page, µbenign
= 3,072.74 posts per page; Mann Whitney U statistic =
230474.0, p-value<0.01). However, benign pages gathered
more likes than malicious pages (µmalicious = 64,330.59 likes
per page, µbenign = 112,250.36 likes per page; Mann Whit-
ney U statistic = 314109.5, p-value<0.01).
For the rest of the paper, we use the most recent 100 posts
for all our analysis.
Mean value
(a) Total number of posts
published.
Mean value
(b) Total number of page
likes gathered.
Figure 2: Distribution of the total number of posts
published, and number of page likes gathered by
pages in our dataset. Malicious pages published
more posts than benign pages.
Table 3 provides a detailed description of the number of
posts and pages along with their WOT categories in our ma-
licious pages dataset of 627 pages. We found a total of 20,999
posts which contained one or more malicious URLs. These
posts engaged a total of 675,162 unique users who liked,
commented, or shared these posts. Interestingly, we found
that spam and phishing (two of the most common types of
malicious content studied in literature) were the least com-
mon types of malicious content in our dataset. Child unsafe
content was the most common, followed by untrustworthy
content.
11Due to API rate limitations, we had to restrict our data
collection to 50,000 likes per post. We had 2 malicious and
291 benign posts which exceeded this limit.
WOT Response No. of pages No. of posts
Child unsafe 387 10,891
Untrustworthy 317 8,057
Questionable 312 8,859
Negative 266 5,863
Adult content 162 3,290
Spam 124 4,985
Phishing 39 495
Total 627 20,999
Table 3: Number of malicious posts and pages in
each category in our dataset. Number of pages post-
ing phishing and spam URLs was the lowest.
3. MALICIOUS PAGES ON FACEBOOK
We now present our analysis and explore the character-
istics of malicious and benign pages in detail. In particu-
lar, we identified and studied the most prominent entities
posting malicious content, domain distribution of malicious
domains, etc. We also studied and compared malicious and
benign pages on the basis of their temporal behavior and
network structure.
3.1 Entities posting malicious content
We first performed term-frequency analysis on unigrams,
bigrams, and trigrams obtained from page names in our
dataset to identify the most prominent entities generating
malicious (and benign) content. Figure 3 represents the top
75 unigrams obtained from page names. We found domi-
nant presence of politically polarized entities and religious
groups from keywords like american, british, patriot, de-
fense, conservative, supporters, christian, united, etc. in ma-
licious pages (Figure 3(a)). Bigram and trigram analysis con-
firmed wide presence of entities like British National Party
(BNP), The Tea Party, English Defense League, American
conservatives, Geert Wilders supporters, etc. We also found
some malicious pages dedicated to pop bands (One Direc-
tion), radio channels (Kiss FM), pages using anonymous in
their names, etc. We manually inspected all the aforemen-
tioned pages and validated that the page names were aligned
with the content published by these pages, and were not mis-
leading.
Using the bigram and trigram analysis, we divided pages
belonging to politically polarized entities into four broad
groups based on page names to help us study them bet-
ter. These groups were i) America (9 pages), containing
pages with “america” in their page name, ii) British Na-
tional Party (7 pages), containing pages mentioning British
National Party or BNP in their page name, iii) Conserva-
tive (6 pages), containing pages with the term“conservative”
in the page name, and iv) Defence League (11 pages), con-
taining pages using the phrase “defence league” in the page
name. We manually verified each page to ensure that they
fit in the group they were assigned. However, to maintain
anonymity, we do not reveal the exact page names. We per-
formed linguistic analysis on the content published by these
4 categories of pages separately using LIWC2007 [21]. LIWC
is a text analysis software to assess emotional, cognitive, and
structural components of text samples using a psychomet-
rically validated internal dictionary. It determines the rate
at which certain cognitions and emotions (for example, per-
(a) Word cloud for malicious pages. We found dom-
inant presence of some politically polarized enti-
ties.
(b) Word cloud for benign pages. Words in benign
page names were more generic.
Figure 3: Word clouds of the top 75 terms appearing
in page names in our dataset. The size of the term
is proportional to its frequency.
sonal concerns like religion, death, and positive or negative
emotions) are present in the text. LIWC has been widely
used in the past to study social media content related to
politics [23, 27, 28].
We focused our analysis on 12 dimensions in order to pro-
file the sentiment of content published by these groups of
pages: Positive emotion, negative emotion, anxiety, anger,
sadness, money, religion, death, sexuality, past orientation,
future orientation, and swear words. Figure 4 shows the
results of our analysis. We found high degree of anger in
content from all categories. We also observed that only one
category of pages (British National Party) had more posi-
tive emotions that negative emotions. The Defence League
pages had much higher negative emotions as compared to
positive emotions, followed by America pages. Conservative
pages were almost equal in terms of positive and negative
emotions. These findings contradicted prior results where
researchers found that positive emotions outweighed nega-
tive emotions by 2 to 1 for profiles of all German political
candidates [28]. We also found substantial presence of con-
tent related to religion. These observations are indicative
of the kind of influence that politically polarized pages in
our dataset can have on their audience. To the best of our
knowledge, no prior work in social network spam literature
has looked at this class of malicious content.
Benign page names were found to represent a variety of
categories and interests including photography, school, love,
news, confessions, services, etc., as shown in Figure 3(b)
Bigram and trigram analysis revealed presence of a set of
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Figure 4: Linguistic analysis of content produced by
politically polarized groups of pages in our dataset.
We found high presence of negative emotion, anger,
and religion related content.
methodist church pages. We also found some overlap between
malicious and benign page names, for example, One Direc-
tion fan pages, and radio channel pages. Unlike malicious
pages, we did not find any fixed category of pages dominat-
ing in benign pages.
3.2 Domain distribution
Scanning the most recent 100 posts (as described in Sec-
tion 2.2) revealed that almost half of the pages (49.28%)
in our dataset published 10 or less posts containing a mali-
cious URL. Overall, the median number of domains shared
by these pages was 24.5. On the contrary, the median num-
ber of domains shared by the other half of the pages posting
more than 10 posts containing a malicious URL (50.72%)
was 5. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of ma-
licious posts versus the total number of domains shared by
all malicious pages in our dataset. We found a weak declining
trend in the number of domains as the number of malicious
posts increased (r = -0.223, p-value<0.01).
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Figure 5: Number of malicious posts versus all do-
mains published by all 627 pages in our dataset. We
observed a weak declining trend in the total num-
ber of domains when the number of malicious posts
published by a page increased.13
This declining trend (and negative correlation) indicated
that pages posting a large number of malicious URLs tend
to do so from a small subset of domains. Infact, 84 pages
in our dataset (13.39%) shared URLs from only 1 domain.
Out of these, 53 pages (8.45%) published more than 90 posts
containing a malicious URL, gathering likes and comments
from 55,171 and 31,390 distinct users respectively. Most cer-
tainly, such pages exist for the sole purpose of promoting a
single (malicious) domain, and are successful in engaging
thousands of Facebook users. This sort of activity closely
resembles social spam campaigns, which have been stud-
ied by multiple researchers in the past [11, 12, 34]. How-
ever, since most past research has focused on more obvious
threats like unsolicited and targeted spam, advertising, and
bulk messaging, other types of malicious content concerned
with trustworthiness and child safety has largely remained
unaddressed.
Note that there also exist multiple legitimate pages on
Facebook dedicated to promote a single domain, for ex-
ample, FIFA World Cup page (exclusively posting fifa.com
URLs), BBC News page (exclusively posting bbc.com URLs),
etc. We found 118 benign pages in our dataset (9.23%) which
were dedicated to promote a particular domain. Such behav-
ior cannot therefore be associated exclusively with malicious
activity. Malicious pages seem to take advantage of this fact
and continue their activity, hiding in plain sight.
Top domains.
Table 4 lists the 10 most frequently occurring domains in
our dataset of malicious pages, along with their WOT clas-
sification, Facebook audience, and Alexa world ranking. 14
For each domain, we calculated the number of posts the do-
main appeared in, the sum of likes, comments, and shares on
all these posts, the number of pages the domain appeared
in, and the sum of likes on all these pages. It was inter-
esting to observe that 3 out of the top 10 domains were
very famous, and were ranked within the top 3,000 domains
worldwide on the Alexa ranking. Two of these domains were
reported for being unsafe for children and spreading adult
content. Although the Internet does not restrict the creation
and promotion of adult and child unsafe content, most OSNs
including Facebook have established community standards
which restrict the display of adult and explicit content [9].
All of the other domains had low Alexa ranking worldwide.
Only 3 of the top 10 domains were marked as spam, and
none of the domains in the top 10 were reported for phishing
or malware, signifying that untrustworthy and child unsafe
content is much more prominent on Facebook than tradi-
tional forms of malicious content like spam and phishing.
The number of posts and pages associated with each of the
top 10 domains revealed that there existed multiple Face-
book pages dedicated to promoting all of these domains. We
observed that all of the top 10 domains appeared in 2 or more
pages, and two of the domains appeared in over 10 pages
(ridichegratis.com in 21 pages; 9cric.com in 13 pages). At
least 4 of the top 10 domains (ammboi.com, ghanafilla.net,
pulsd.com, and 970wfla.com) had two or more Facebook
pages each (3 for ghanafilla.net, 5 for ammboi.com), heav-
ily promoting their respective domains (over 90 out of the
13Three outliers (sharing 1,257, 202 and 140 domains) have
been removed in this graph.
14http://www.alexa.com/
100 posts containing the domain, per page). Pages set up for
these domains also had a substantial audience, with 6 out
of the 10 domains collectively having over 100,000 likes on
their pages. Two of the top 10 domains had over 1 million
likes (collectively) on pages promoting them. The collective
number of likes, comments, and shares on posts was how-
ever, considerably low as compared to collective likes on the
pages. Only 3 out of the top 10 domains managed 1,000 or
more likes on the posts associated with them. This indicated
that while malicious domains in our dataset were success-
ful in gathering a substantial audience in the form of page
likes, they were not as successful in engaging the audience
with their content. We also observed that 2 of the 3 do-
mains with high Alexa rank (blesk.cz and perezhilton.com)
also had high number of page likes and high number of likes,
comments, and shares on posts. This signified that domains
which were popular (more visited) on the Internet were also
more famous on Facebook.
3.3 Temporal behavior
We explored the temporal activity of all pages in our
dataset to determine how active the pages were. To be able
to quantitatively compare the activity of malicious and be-
nign pages, we calculated a daily activity ratio for each page,
defined by the ratio of number of days a page was active
(published one or more posts) versus the total number of
days between the first and hundredth post by the page.
daily activity ratio = no. of days active
no. of days between first and last post
Figure 6(b) shows the daily activity ratio plots of all ma-
licious and benign pages in our dataset. We observed that
27.43% of all malicious pages were active daily as compared
to only 8.60% daily active benign pages. On average, ma-
licious pages were 1.4 times more active daily as compared
to benign pages in our dataset. We also calculated activity
ratio in terms on number of hours and number of weeks, and
observed similar results. Table 5 shows the average hourly,
daily, and weekly activity ratios of all malicious and benign
pages in our dataset. Malicious pages were found to be 3
times as active as benign pages in terms of hourly activity
(Figure 6(a)), and 1.04 times as active in terms of weekly
activity (Figure 6(c)). All activity ratio values were com-
pared using Mann-Whitney U test and the differences were
found to be statistically significant (p-value<0.01 for all ex-
periments) [18]. These difference confirmed that malicious
pages in our dataset were more active as compared to be-
nign pages, and published more frequently.
Activity ratio Malicious Benign
Hourly 0.015 0.005
Daily 0.52 0.37
Weekly 0.73 0.70
Table 5: Average activity ratios of malicious and
benign pages in our dataset. Malicious pages were
found to be more active than benign pages.
While studying the timestamps of posts published by pages,
we came across some dormant pages that had not published
a post in a long time. In literature, this behavior has been
associated with malicious entities who set up OSN accounts
to publish spam and propaganda just after a major event has
Domain WOT class, categories Posts Likes | comments | shares Pages Page
likes
Alexa
rank
ammboi.com Untrustworthy, suspicious, spam, privacy risks 456 666 | 61 | 195 5 109,012 352,191
ridichegratis.com Untrustworthy 424 428 | 14 | 252 21 2,650,802 -
blesk.cz Child unsafe, adult content 402 3,674 | 2,103 | 1,494 8 864,554 2,924
says.com Child unsafe 386 387 | 15 | 62 5 97,784 27,684
ghanafilla.net Untrustworthy, scam, spam, suspicious 296 192 | 8 | 6 3 54,246 1,360,634
9cric.com Child unsafe 281 1,189 | 121 | 177 13 193,348 923,243
perezhilton.com Child unsafe, adult content 274 26,088 | 3,516 | 1,128 8 1,701,834 2,192
nairaland.com Untrustworthy, misleading claims or unethical 201 238 | 89 | 31 3 116,131 1,329
pulsd.com Untrustworthy, child unsafe 199 2 | 0 | 0 2 19,020 247,480
970wfla.com Spam 194 700 | 448 | 280 2 22,486 277,467
Table 4: Top 10 malicious domains in our dataset with their Web of Trust classification, Facebook audience,
and Alexa world rank.
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(a) Hourly activity ratio of malicious and
benign pages in our dataset.
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(b) Daily activity ratio of malicious and
benign pages in our dataset.
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(c) Weekly activity ratio of malicious
and benign pages in our dataset.
Figure 6: Comparative analysis of daily, hourly, and weekly temporal activity of pages in our dataset. We
found that malicious pages were more active than benign pages.
taken place, and become inactive (or are suspended for suspi-
cious behavior) soon after [15]. Figure 7(a) shows the times-
tamps of the last post generated by malicious and benign
pages in our dataset. We calculated the average dormancy
period (number of days between last post and data collection
day), and did not find a substantial difference between ma-
licious and benign pages (µmalicious = 102.84 days, µbenign
= 91.16 days, Mann Whitney U test statistic = 381769.5, p-
value<0.05). We observed that 11.16% malicious pages (and
10.01% benign pages) in our dataset had been dormant for
one year or more, while 20.41% malicious pages (and 15.33%
benign pages) had not published a post in six months or
more. These similar numbers for dormancy period of mali-
cious and benign pages indicated the absence of any large
group of malicious pages that may have been set up as part of
a campaign, and became dormant together. However, there
may exist some malicious pages in our dataset that were cre-
ated right after an event to publish malicious content, and
became inactive soon after.
Popularity over time.
We monitored the 627 malicious pages for two months,
taking a snapshot of their page information every day be-
tween August 13 and October 13, 2015. Figure 7(b) shows
the percentage of likes gained by the pages over the two-
month period. Over 90% of the pages underwent a gain /
loss of under 10% in page likes. We found a positive corre-
lation (r>0.7, p-value<0.05) between page likes and time
for 343 pages (54.7%). We also found negative correlation
(r<-0.7, p-value<0.05) for 147 pages (23.1%). The maxi-
mum gain for pages with increasing likes was 99.95%, while
the maximum loss for pages with decreasing likes over time
was only 4.87%. Likes on the rest of the pages were not
strongly correlated with time. These numbers indicate that
more (over double) number of malicious pages gained popu-
larity over time as compared to the number of pages which
lose popularity over time. Further, the gain far outweighs
the loss. Visibly, malicious pages don’t just exist, but gain
popularity over time. This data collection is active. We in-
tend to analyze the behavior of malicious pages and compare
them with the behavior of benign pages over time in more
detail in the future.
3.4 Post and page metadata
Analyzing the metadata of posts in our dataset revealed
some significant differences in the type of content published
by malicious and benign pages. Figure 8 shows the distribu-
tion of the content type of posts published by all pages in
our dataset. We observed that more than half of the content
published by benign pages were photos and videos (50.16%).
This percentage went down to 32.42% for malicious pages.
The metadata also revealed that over half of the posts pub-
lished by malicious pages were links (54.69%), where as less
than a quarter of all posts published by benign pages were
links (24.45%). These numbers indicate that malicious pages
are inclined towards posting links, and directing user traffic
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Figure 7: Time of last post of malicious and benign
pages, and likes gained by malicious pages over time.
to external websites. On the other hand, benign pages tend
to post more pictures and videos, which can be consumed
by users without leaving the OSN. In addition to content
types, we looked at the status types of posts and found that
benign pages published almost double the amount of content
through mobile devices (23.80%) as compared to malicious
pages (12.33%).
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Figure 8: Types of content published by malicious
and benign pages in our dataset. Malicious pages
published more links, while benign pages published
more pictures and videos.
All pages on Facebook have a category associated with
them, for example Community, Company, Personal Web-
site, etc. This category is assigned to the page by the page
administrator(s) at the time of page creation, according to
the person / organization represented by the page, and con-
tent that the page generates. To see if any subset of cate-
gories was more popular among a particular class of pages
(malicious or benign), we compared category ranks and found
strong correlation between category ranks across malicious
and benign pages (Spearman’s ρ = 0.67, p-value<0.01). This
indicated that the distribution of malicious and benign pages
across various categories was fairly similar, and that cate-
gories more popular among malicious pages were also more
popular among benign pages. We also compared the page
likes and page mentions (talking about count field) of ma-
licious and benign pages, and did not find any significant
differences.
These observations indicated that apart from the type and
source of published content, there were no significant differ-
ences in the meta information between malicious and benign
pages in our dataset. Metrics like popularity (likes) and user
mentions (talking about count) associated with OSN entities
can be used to identify spammers, since they capture the no-
tion of influence of entities in the network [6]. However, sim-
ilarities in such metrics across malicious and benign pages
can aid malicious pages to continue operating regularly and
go undetected for long periods of time, hiding in plain sight.
3.5 Network analysis
Past research has shown that decentralized networks are
prone to sybil attacks, wherein malicious entities tend to col-
lude together and attempt to infiltrate the legitimate part of
the network [8]. Such attacks have also been studied in con-
text of other OSNs [33]. To investigate if such phenomenon
exists for Facebook pages too, we analyzed the likes, com-
ments, and shares networks for both malicious and benign
pages in our dataset. Facebook does not provide an API end-
point to gather the list of users who have liked (subscribed
to) a page. However, it is possible to collect the list of users
who have liked, commented on, or shared posts originating
from a page. As described in Section 2.2, we collected all
likes, comments, and shares on the most recent 100 posts of
all pages in our dataset, and analyzed the inter and intra-
page networks. In particular, we analyzed networks consist-
ing of pages and users liking, commenting on, or sharing
posts from two or more pages in our dataset (malicious and
benign separately) (inter-page networks), and networks of
pages liking, commenting on, or sharing posts from pages
within our dataset (malicious and benign separately) (intra-
page networks). To keep the network size comparable, we
averaged out the results for 10 random samples of 627 be-
nign pages each (same size as malicious pages dataset) drawn
from the entire dataset of 1,278 benign pages. We used Gephi
for all our analysis [3].
Table 6 shows the details of the network analysis. We
found that the Inter-likes network for benign pages (83,799
nodes) was much larger and stronger (avg. weighted de-
gree: 41.695) than the Inter-likes network for malicious pages
(21,947 nodes, avg. weighted degree: 24.273), indicating that
a larger number of users liked two or more benign pages as
compared to the number of users who liked two or more
malicious pages in our dataset. More interestingly, we found
stronger ties (avg. weighted degree for Intra-page networks)
within malicious pages in all aspects (likes, comments, and
shares) as compared to benign pages, indicating collusion
and sybil behavior within malicious pages. We also found a
much larger number of communities in all Inter-page net-
works for benign pages as compared to Inter-page networks
for malicious pages, indicating a larger and more diverse au-
dience for benign pages as compared to malicious pages.
Stronger ties within malicious pages prompted us to fur-
ther investigate the communities we detected from Intra-
page likes, comments, and shares networks. Figure 9 shows
the network graphs of the detected communities. We ob-
served that post sharing was the most prominent intra-page
activity, followed by liking and commenting. The network
graphs also revealed a distinct community of six Facebook
pages completely connected to each other in terms of likes
(Figure 9(a)) and shares (Figure 9(c)). Five out of these
six pages also formed a community in the intra-comments
graph (Fig 9(b)). All pages in this community belonged to
adult stars and promoted pornographic content. This be-
havior closely resembled a sybil network, and strongly in-
Network type Total
nodes
Total
edges
Avg. weighted
degree
Density Modularity No. of com-
munities
Weakly connected
components
Malicious (All 627 pages)
Inter-page likes network 21,947 103,683 24.273 0 0.492 18 2
Inter-page comments network 3,901 13,957 11.255 0.001 0.607 19 2
Inter-page shares network 14,318 67,513 15.796 0 0.480 14 1
Intra-page likes network 27 35 8.333 0.05 0.389 9 9
Intra-page comments network 9 9 1.667 0.125 0.551 3 3
Intra-page shares network 68 65 6.309 0.014 0.705 21 21
Benign (Results averaged across 10 random samples of 627 benign pages each)
Inter-page likes network 83,799 390,854 41.695 0 0.391 3070 1
Inter-page comments network 2,958 7,722 8.919 0.001 0.595 142 2
Inter-page shares network 3,406 10,234 9.920 0.001 0.620 30 1
Intra-page likes network 4.3 3.6 0.408 0.075 0.079 0.7 0.7
Intra-page comments network 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intra-page shares network 7.8 6.9 1.168 0.072 0.175 1.1 1.1
Table 6: Network analysis of likes, comments and shares networks within and between pages in our dataset.
We observed that malicious pages had stronger intra-network ties as compared to benign pages.
dicated that all these pages were controlled by / belong to
the same real-world entity (person or organization). We also
found multiple two-page communities involving politically
polarized pages, where one page heavily engaged in liking,
commenting on, and sharing the other page’s content. We
intentionally do not provide any information about these
pages (page name, ID, etc.) to maintain anonymity.
4. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the implications of our analy-
sis and results. We also discuss potential directions for new
techniques to curb the spread of malicious content on OSNs.
Politically polarized entities: Our analysis revealed
the presence of some politically polarized entities in our
dataset of malicious pages. We do not intend to implicate
such entities from our findings. Entities involved in politics
tend to be followed by masses with similar orientation, and
is a global phenomenon in the real world. It is likely that
such activity exists on online platforms other than Facebook
too. We do not propose to debar such activity. However, we
believe that extremely polar content should be moderated
both online and offline, in order to maintain stability among
the masses. An easy way to moderate such entities can be
to display nudges or warning messages to users before they
subscribe to such pages on any online platform [30].
Beyond pages: Pages on Facebook have a lot in common
with Facebook groups and events. Groups and events can
also be used to target large audiences at once. Moreover,
Facebook has a common definition of“Page Spam”for pages,
groups and events, and explicitly states that Pages, groups
or events that confuse, mislead, surprise or defraud people
on Facebook are considered abusive. Our analysis and results
can thus be easily extended to study malicious groups and
events as well.
Automatic identification of malicious pages: Our
findings shed some light on various differences (like temporal
behavior, content type, etc.) between malicious and benign
pages, which can be used to train machine learning models
to automatically differentiate between malicious and benign
pages. These findings, however, are based on a limited his-
tory (up to 100 posts) of page activity. Although it is possible
to collect and analyze the entire history for all pages, doing
so would be time consuming and computationally expensive.
Analyzing complete page history will also be prone to miss-
ing out on smaller, subtle behavioral patterns while looking
at the bigger scheme of things. Moreover, pages can change
behavior over time; malicious pages may stop spreading ma-
licious content, while benign pages may start engaging in
posting malicious content over time. In order to be effective
in the modern era, machine learning based solutions need
to be quick, real time and robust. To accommodate such
changes in behavior, we recommend a self-adaptive model
which relies partly on page information and partly on the
recent activity by the page. The amount of history (number
of posts) to consider can be decided experimentally. Such a
model would be accommodative of the changing behavior of
pages over time, and may remain accurate for long without
the need for re-training.
5. RELATEDWORK
Multiple researchers have studied and proposed techniques
to detect malicious content on Facebook and other OSNs in
the past. Gao et al. presented an initial study to quantify
and characterize spam campaigns launched using accounts
on Facebook [11]. They studied a large anonymized dataset
of 187 million asynchronous “wall” messages between Face-
book users, and used a set of automated techniques to de-
tect and characterize coordinated spam campaigns. Authors
of this work relied on URL blacklists to detect spam URLs
and concentrated on spam, phishing and malware. Follow-
ing up their work, Gao et al. presented an online spam fil-
tering system that could be deployed as a component of the
OSN platform to inspect messages generated by users in real
time [10]. In an attempt to protect Facebook users from ma-
licious posts, Rahman et al. designed a social malware de-
tection method which took advantage of the social context
of posts [22]. Authors were able to achieve a maximum true
positive rate of 97%, using a SVM based classifier trained on
6 features. This model was then used to develop MyPage-
Keeper 15, a Facebook app to protect users from malicious
posts. Similar to Gao et al’s work [11], this work was also
15https://apps.facebook.com/mypagekeeper/
(a) Malicious pages liking each others’
posts; intra-likes network.
(b) Malicious pages commenting on
each others’ posts; intra-comments
network.
(c) Malicious pages sharing each oth-
ers’ posts; intra-shares network.
Figure 9: Network graphs capturing intra-page activity within malicious pages in our dataset. We found
multiple two-node communities and a few bigger communities.
targeted at detecting spam campaigns.
Stringhini et al. [25] utilized a honeypot model to collect
information about spammers on Facebook. They created and
monitored a honey profile for over one year, and manually
identified 173 spam profiles among a total of 3,831 friend-
ship requests they received. This technique, however, is not
extendable to Facebook pages. Ahmed et al. presented a
Markov Clustering (MCL) based approach for the detection
of spam profiles on Facebook. Authors crawled the public
content posted by 320 handpicked Facebook users, out of
which, 165 were manually identified as spammers, and 155 as
legitimate. Authors then extracted 3 features from these pro-
files, viz. Active friends, Page Likes, and URLs to generate a
weighted graph, which served as input to the Markov Clus-
tering model [2]. Thomas et al. identified and studied over
1.1 million accounts suspended by Twitter for disruptive ac-
tivities. Authors identified an emerging marketplace of il-
legitimate programs operated by spammers that included
Twitter account sellers, ad-based URL shorteners, and spam
affiliate programs that helped enable underground market
diversification. Their results showed that 77% of spam ac-
counts identified by Twitter were suspended within one day
of their first tweet [26]. Grier et al. also studied spam on
the Twitter network and found that 8% of 25 million URLs
posted to the site pointed to phishing, malware, and scams
listed on popular blacklists [12].
Most aforementioned research relied on URL blacklists
to identify ground truth spam, phishing, and malware, and
tried to identify patterns which could be used to design effec-
tive measures to curb the spread of spam on OSN platforms.
However, fewer attempts have been made to go beyond the
traditional spam, phishing, and malware, and address other
classes of malicious content on OSNs which include untrust-
worthy content, hate and discrimination, etc. that are non-
trivial to identify through automated means. There has been
some research in the space of identifying credible content on
Twitter [5, 14], but state-of-the-art techniques proposed by
researchers to detect content credibility have not been able
to achieve the degree of efficiency that has been achieved in
detecting traditional spam, phishing and malware.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
OSNs are full of a wide range of hostile entities that pro-
mote and spread various types of malicious content. In this
paper, we identified and characterized Facebook pages post-
ing malicious URLs. We moved beyond traditional types
of malicious content like unsolicited bulk messages, spam,
phishing, malware, etc. that have been widely studied in the
past, and studied a wider range of content that is deemed
as malicious by community standards and Page Spam def-
initions established by Facebook. We focused our analy-
sis on Facebook pages because of their public nature, vast
audience, and inflated malicious activity [7]. Our observa-
tions revealed significant presence of politically polarized
entities among malicious pages. Further, we found a sub-
stantial number of malicious pages dedicated to promote
content from a single malicious domain. We also observed
that malicious pages were more active than benign pages
in terms of hourly, daily, and weekly activity. There existed
some famous domains amongst the 10 most popular mali-
cious domains in our dataset which were reported for child
unsafe and adult content. Network analysis revealed possible
presence of collusive behavior among malicious pages that
engaged heavily in promoting each others’ content. To the
best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies focused
on characterizing Facebook pages posting malicious content.
We believe that our findings will enable researchers to bet-
ter understand the landscape of malicious Facebook pages
that have been hiding in plain sight and promoting malicious
content seemingly unperturbed.
In future, we would like to do a detailed longitudinal study
on malicious Facebook pages to characterize their behavior
over time. We also plan to use our findings to devise efficient
automated techniques and develop technological solutions to
enable end users to identify malicious Facebook pages. We
would also like to expand our analysis to identify malicious
“groups” and “events” on Facebook which largely remain un-
explored to date.
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